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WHO'S THE BOSS?-THE "PUBLIC INTEREST VS.
AGENCY INTEREST" BALANCING ACT OF
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY GENERAL COUNSELS
Ryan M. Checkt
In the last seven years, national security issues of increasingly
high stakes have brought an end to America's "holiday from
history." These issues have thrust into a more prominent light not
only our intelligence agencies, but also the General Counsels (GC)
and Office of General Counsel (OGC) attorneys who advise them.
In many cases, we have demanded more and more from our
intelligence agencies without providing clear guidance as to how
they may produce these results. When, for example, agencies must
seek information from captured terrorists with guidelines such as:
"You may not use interrogation methods that are 'cruel, inhuman,
or degrading,"' their attorneys must interpret these nebulous terms
to determine exactly where policymakers intended to set the legal
boundaries.
In advising their agencies, these attorneys tread a sort of
tightrope. On the one hand, the attorneys represent the agency,
and thus owe a duty of loyalty to the agency and its views on how to
best execute its national security obligations. On the other hand,
the attorneys are government employees and public servants, and
are therefore tasked with defending the nation's citizens and its
laws. Critics argue that by leaning too far toward agency interests,
the attorneys become facilitators or enablers in skirting or ignoring
the law. But by leaning too far toward the public interest, the
agency may self-limit its authority to the point where it cannot
provide the protection that the public desires. Assuming that it is
likely to be either rare or impracticable to give equal consideration
to both interests, which way should the agency attorney lean?'
t Ryan Check is an associate attorney at Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly
LLP in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He received his J.D., summa cum laude, from
William Mitchell College of Law, where he served as Editor-in-Chief of the William
Mitchell Law Review.
1. For simplicity, the majority of this essay will simply refer to the GC, but
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While some academics have already dissected this question
from a theoretical viewpoint, this article examines the subject from
a more empirical perspective. To that end, I posed three questions
about this balancing act to attorneys who currently serve, or have
served, our intelligence agencies, and to outside observers whose
occupations bring them into close contact with the agencies.
Responding to these questions were:
* Steven Aftergood - Director, Project on Government
Secrecy, Federation of American Scientists
* Marion "Spike" Bowman - Former Senior Counsel
(National Security Law), Federal Bureau of
Investigation
" Jeffrey Breinholt - Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism
Section, National Security Division, U.S. Department of
Justice
* Richard Cinquegrana - National Academy of Public
Administration; Former Legal Counsel to the CIA
Inspector General; Deputy Counsel for Intelligence
Policy, U.S. Department of Justice; Assistant General
Counsel, CIA
" Robert Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law,
University of St. Thomas School of Law; Former Special
Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of
Justice; Former Deputy General Counsel, White House
Office of Homeland Security
* Dr. Dieter Fleck - Former Director, International
Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defense,
Germany
* Laura Hill - Former attorney, CIA Office of General
should be read as being applicable to all attorneys within the OGC whose job it is
to provide legal counsel to the agency.
2. See, e.g., A. John Radsan, Sed Quis Custodiet Ispos Custodes: The CIA 's Office of
General Counsel 2J. OF NAT'L SECURrry L. & POL'Y (forthcoming May 2008).
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Counsel
" Paul Kelbaugh - Former Chief Legal Counsel, CIA
Latin America; Former Deputy Chief, Legal Group,
DCI Counterterrorism Center, CIA
* David Koplow - Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center; Former Deputy General
Counsel (International Affairs), U.S. Department of
Defense
* Jonathan S. Landay - Senior National Security and
Intelligence Correspondent, McClatchy Newspapers
* Dana Priest - National Security Correspondent,
Washington Post
* John A. Rizzo - Acting General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency
* Robert F. Turner - Professor of Law & Associate
Director, Center for National Security Law, University
of Virginia School of Law; Former Counsel to
President's Intelligence Oversight Board
The following is a series of composite answers to those
questions that incorporate many common themes and specific
insights of the respondents.' Their responses provide us with a
valuable perspective on this debate, and help us to better
understand the challenges that intelligence-agency attorneys face
in providing legal guidance on matters of national security.
3. The respondents' full email answers are available on the website of the
National Security Forum at http://www.wmitchell.edu/national+security+forum/
documents/appendix.html.
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L In balancing his responsibilities, should the General Counsel of an
intelligence agency lean toward protecting the agency's interest or protecting
the public's interest?
A. The Public Interest
Most respondents who favored the public interest as the
agency's top priority rejected the assumption that public and
agency interests could not be reconciled. Mr. Cinquegrana
contended that "the agency's interest should never be out of line
with the public interest," a notion Mr. Rizzo seconded, saying that
there could be "nothing either-or about it." Mr. Bowman
emphasized that while the agency lawyer owes a duty to his client, a
higher duty is owed to the nation. The GC is, by definition, a
public servant; he should be neither a shill for the agency nor a
sycophant. After all, said Mr. Landay, the public pays the salary of
the GC-and all public servants-to protect the rights and well-
being of the public, not agency management.
As Dr. Fleck pointed out, there is no "intelligence exception"
to the good governance principle of serving the public interest.
Mr. Landay stressed that if the agency violates the law, the GC must
report up the chain of command to disclose the harm. And if the
agency will not deal with the issue internally, the GC would owe a
duty to the public to seek alternative means to disclose the harm
done. Even in cases involving classification or sensitive
information, the Justice Department and congressional
intelligence-oversight committees provide opportunities for the GC
to "report out" if problems arise.
Regardless of whether one agrees that agency and public
interests are entirely parallel, Mr. Rizzo maintained that it is
essential for the GC to simultaneously protect agency and public
interests. "[Intelligence agencies'] paramount interests are to do
everything in [their] power to protect the national security, as well
as operate [consistently] with the values of our society." And,
Professor Delahunty noted, if the agency operates within the law,
public and agency interests should not collide. But as the agencies
strive to protect our national security, potential conflicts can arise.
Here, the GC has a duty to reconcile any conflicts between agency
interest and public interest that arise, which Mr. Bowman and
Professor Koplow believe can be done in most cases.
Ms. Priest took a slightly different tack, and suggested that
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"[t]he agencies' interest, in the long run, is the public's interest. If
General Counsels are too short-sighted ... they will not, ultimately,
serve the agency's interest well, which is to survive in a healthy,
legal manner." And since political appointees may only serve an
agency for a short time, they may view the agency's long-term
interest too narrowly, which can cause them to run afoul of both
agency and public interests. As such, Ms. Priest asserted that the
GC must think strategically and, "above anyone else within the
intelligence agency, [the GC must] be anchored in the rule of law
and its historical application vis-a-vis intelligence matters as it
intersects with the public's interest."
B. The Agency Interest
Those who stressed the GC's allegiance to the agency also
argued that the GC advances the public interest where he
vigorously represents the agency's interests. Most often, the GC
does so by either advising legal means to accomplish the agency's
goals, or raising concerns when the agency veers toward illegality.
Mr. Aftergood and Ms. Hill insisted that, if the agency operates
within the law, the GC will have fulfilled his duty. Of course, while
the attorney's task is to show the full spectrum of legal action, the
boundaries of legality must be legitimate and established in good
faith. Dr. Fleck underscored that if the GC condoned "a little
torture," he would clearly violate his duty.
Mr. Breinholt suggested that the need to defend the agency's
interest may become even more pronounced when interagency
disputes arise. During interagency turf battles, it is not uncommon
for an agency attorney to be accused of protecting the agency
rather than the public; but these claims usually amount to mere
gamesmanship, and should not force one side to capitulate. When
the attorney asserts the agency interest in these cases, it most often
leads to the issue being more thoroughly considered before a
decision is reached, which again benefits the public.
Others supported the supremacy of agency interest because
issues that affect the public interest tend to encompass policy
decisions that belong to agency management. Thus, Mr. Kelbaugh
maintained that the GC should focus on being an informed advisor
to his client, using his position to keep his client on the proper
path, and not substituting his judgment for that of the
policymakers. Professor Turner proposed that, while every
government attorney's highest duty is to the Constitution, unless
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the attorney views an action as illegal or contrary to an executive
order or presidential directive, the attorney must respect the
agency's judgment call, especially regarding "the business of
intelligence .... If lawyers start second-guessing policy decisions,
the end result very quickly will be that policymakers will stop
consulting lawyers and will act on their own instincts."
Professor Turner believed that the GC should feel free to raise
concerns or policy arguments to management, but has no right to
ignore orders or decisions, to falsely tell a client an activity is illegal
in order to block policy decisions, or to carry his objections outside
the agency because of a purely policy-based disagreement. The
attorney's role is to help the client-within the structure of the
law-notwithstanding the attorney's own potential difference of
opinion. If the GC concludes that laws are being broken, there are
remedies within the system. But if the GC complains too loudly or
too often about policy decisions, the agency is less likely to seek his
counsel.
II. To what extent should the General Counsel of an intelligence agency-
as opposed to, for instance, a corporate General Counsel-alter his counsel
and advice to the organization based purely on concerns for the interests of
those outside the agency?
A. GC Should Consider External Interests
Many who favored a GC protective of the public interest also
felt that the GC should consider external interests when
formulating recommendations. Mr. Cinquegrana reiterated that
the agency and public interests should be congruent, and that the
GC cannot advise action that is against the public interest. And
Messrs. Rizzo, Bowman, and Landay all insisted on the GC's role as
a servant of the people, whose obligation is to consider at all times
whether agency actions harm Americans' rights or well-being.
External factors are thus especially important to the GC in
providing the agency with the clearest and most accurate advice on
the law. Mr. Rizzo asserted that, to provide counsel-as distinct
from mere legal advice-the GC must advise his client about the
legality of proposed actions, but also about the prudence of the
proposed action and its potential reception by those outside the
agency. Mr. Bowman stated that, in this respect, the GC has a duty
to align his agency with the public's social values, which may
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change within a short time, and which may, as Ms. Hill noted,
require the GC to be more conservative in his advice.
But even those who advocated considering extra-agency
interests agreed that the GC cannot rely solely on external factors.
Professor Delahunty contended that such reliance would likely
destroy agency morale, and could compromise the GC's
relationship with other agency employees. But to the extent that
external factors affect the agency's interest-for instance, the
preferences of the White House and Congress-the GC would be
well-served to consider these factors in formulating advice and
counsel.
B. GC Should Not Consider External Interests
Ms. Priest provided the most succinct answer to the question of
when the GC should consider extra-agency interests in formulating
advice: "Never." The primary resistance to the GC considering
non-agency interests was again grounded in the concern that the
GC's role does not involve policymaking. Mr. Kelbaugh
maintained that by defining activities that would be illegal, the GC
protects his clients and operates within the structure of the law.
Concerns for extra-agency interests then become policy matters,
which he and Professor Turner agreed were best reserved for
management. Since the GC bears a duty of loyalty to his client, he
should be an advocate for the agency. Within that duty, there is no
policy function for the GC, so he should not infringe on the policy
discretion committed to the agency.
From Mr. Cinquegrana's perspective, there should generally
be no need for the GC to alter advice to the agency based solely on
external interests. Where the GC may have concerns about the
welfare of a person in the agency's hands, as opposed to what the
law would permit or require, the GC still must give an "unvarnished
legal opinion." That opinion may be supplemented with the GC's
own moral or personal views, but he must be very careful to
distinguish between those views and the interests of the agency and
the public, which should be paramount.
51032008]
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III. In order for the General Counsel to effectively influence senior
management of an agency, the persons to be influenced must have
confidence that the General Counsel has similar goals for the agency. As
such, is the General Counsel of an intelligence agency capable of performing
an oversight function while still seeking to retain that confidence?
A. Ex Ante Oversight
Mr. Kelbaugh voiced a common view of the GC's counseling
role-giving "timely, tailored, and accurate legal advice on
proposed and actual activities of the agency." Thus, the GC is
particularly well-suited to fill an ex ante oversight role, which
management should desire from the GC. By diligently reviewing
the agency's proposed actions and warning management about
potential legal issues, the GC fulfills his duties to the agency.
Professor Delahunty suggested that this preventative oversight
should promote confidence among agency management, who are
likely to fear the blowback from legal troubles and operational
excesses.
Mr. Breinholt noted that, when actual fraud or wrongdoing is
or has been present, it is often easiest for the GC to provide advice
that will be well received by agency management. But he also
cautioned: "The biggest dilemma for a [GC] would be in situations
where his advice is not considered sufficiently expedient by the
tastes of the client." In these cases, Professor Delahunty proposed
that the GC may be able to obtain additional support for his advice
from outside groups such as the Department of Justice and the
Office of Legal Counsel, or, internally, from the agency's Inspector
General. Supervision by congressional intelligence committees can
also check rogue operations and fortify the GC's power.
In providing this ex ante oversight, Mr. Cinquegrana stressed
that the GC must present his objective counsel to the agency,
regardless of its popularity. The GC cannot compromise his own
judgment in order to stay in senior management's good graces or
he will be abdicating his responsibilities as chief legal counsel and
his standing as an independent source of advice. While the
challenge of standing that ground should not be underestimated,
Mr. Bowman stated that he had never witnessed a GC removed for
being unwilling to bend the rules.
5104 [Vol. 34:5
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B. Ex Post Oversight
Others viewed the GC more as an internal overseer and
monitor than as one who merely provides preventative counsel. In
this role, the GC would serve a function similar to a corporate GC,
and would be part of the larger internal oversight scheme. Thus,
the GC should be able to serve as an independent check and still
maintain the confidence of agency management. In fact, Mr. Rizzo
maintained:
CIA senior management has always looked to-and relied
on-the GC to be a robust and aggressive overseer of
CIA's day-to-day activities, especially in the area for covert
operations .... Indeed, on those isolated occasions over
the years when CIA management has found fault with the
performance of the GC, it was because of a perception
that the GC was not being sufficiently rigorous in this
oversight role.
Where senior management does not have confidence in the
GC, and ignores or consistently disagrees with the counsel he
offers, there was a large consensus that a GC in such a position
should resign. Since the goals of both management and the GC
should be to safeguard the security and rights of the people they
serve, a GC who cannot ensure that senior management complies
with this goal will be ineffective in carrying out his professional
obligations. Professor Delahunty commented that, fortunately,
"most agency [GCs] have sufficient standing in the bar and outside
world that they can be fairly independent of management
pressure." But even where management is unwilling to respond to
the GC's counsel, Mr. Bowman offered an alternative to those who
would advise the GC to resign and stated that "it would take a lot to
get me to resign because I would consider it a duty to try and 'right'
the process."
C. No Oversight Role
While most of the oversight debate centered on the type of
oversight a GC should provide, Mr. Aftergood and Dr. Fleck
believed that the GC's role simply does not include oversight. Dr.
Fleck believed that the GC should not provide oversight unless his
agency's director specifically requested that he do so. Similarly,
Mr. Aftergood felt that the oversight function "must be exercised
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elsewhere-by the congressional oversight committees, the
inspectors general, [the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board], and, not least, the press."
How agency attorneys should balance agency interests against
public interests remains a hotly contested issue, and respondents
on both sides of the debate believe that their approach best serves
the country. But while one side believes that the GC should be
closely attuned to the public's concerns, the other side argues that
the GC should maximize the ability of the agency to use the power
granted it by the public. Similarly, some feel that the GC ought to
serve as both advisor and watchdog, while others contend that the
GC's greatest value in preventing abuse is in the advice that he can
provide before the fact.
And while there is clearly a divide over the extent to which the
GC should leave policy matters to agency management, the GC may
have little choice but to move beyond the role of legal advisor and
wade into the policymaking waters. Without clearer legal
boundaries for intelligence agencies' most sensitive duties, the GC
and other agency attorneys are left with a great deal of discretion to
decide how aggressively or conservatively to interpret existing laws,
and are put in the position of not only advising their client, but of
setting intelligence policy by filling in the white spaces left by
lawmakers. With this kind of responsibility thrust upon them,
determining how these attorneys ought to balance agency interests
against public interests will remain an especially important inquiry.
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